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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the impact of the new Brazilian legislation regulating partnerships 
between the State and Civil Society (Nonprofit) Organizations between 1999 and 2002. The passing of Law No. 
9790/99 – known as the Nonprofit Law – created the legal concept of Organizações da Sociedade Civil de 
Interesse Público – OSCIPs (Public Interest Civil Society Organizations). Based on an exploratory survey, this 
study, using the Institutional Theory, allowed the analysis of how older organizations (NGOs and traditional 
social benefit organizations) resisted to the adoption of the OSCIP standard due to organizational inertia, while 
acceptance of the model was greater among younger organizations, in a clear coercive and normative isomorphic 
development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Between 1995 and 2001, the Federal Government decided to take the lead in a process to consolidate 
a new legal framework for nonprofit organizations, a requirement to allow these organizations to take 
part in formulating and executing public policies in a new way: partnerships between the State and 
Civil Society. As a result of this process, on 24 March 1999 the President of the Republic passed Law 
No. 9790/99 – known as the Nonprofit Law -, which established the legal concept of Public Interest 
Civil Organizations – OSCIPs. 
Two years after the passing of Law No. 9790/99, few nonprofit organizations embraced the new 
standard. Contrary to what might be expected, the new coercive institutional mechanisms (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991) – that provided access to new resources by means of specific Letters of Partnership 
with OSCIPs – were unable to trigger the expected adhesion. Faced with the possibility that the law 
might  not catch, the government took steps to make the legislation more attractive to nonprofit 
organizations, passing Provisional Measures (Medidas Provisórias) No. 2143-33, dated 31 May 2001 
and No. 2113-32, dated 21 June 2001. In practice, these provisional measures brought the new 
legislation closer to the old one, which made the legal change practically innocuous. 
The purpose of this article is to understand – from the perspective of Institutional Theory – the 
changes brought about by the new legislation governing partnership relationships between the State 
and Civil Society (Nonprofit) organizations, based on the low adhesion to the model between 1999 
and 2002. 
This study proceeds as follows. It first presents a bibliographical review of the institutional approach 
to organizations. Then, it discusses the context that led to the passing of Law No. 9790/99 and 
compares this law to its predecessor. Subsequently, it explains how the survey on the alignment of 
Brazilian nonprofit organizations as OSCIPs until March 25th, 2002 took place, so as to enable 
understanding its distinctive traits. Finally, based on the results obtained, it considers the institutional 
issues that caused resistance to the OSCIP model and, consequently, to the change in the law. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE  
 
 
There is increasing acceptance of the Institutional Theory in the field of Brazilian organizational 
studies (Caldas & Vasconcelos, 2002; Carvalho, 1999; Carvalho, Vieira, & Lopes, 1999; Machado-da-
Silva, 2001; Pacheco, 2001; Vieira & Misoczky, 2000), in a development that might even be regarded 
as the institutionalization of the neo-institutional theory itself (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). This process 
of assimilating the institutional theory arises, evidently, from the vast possibilities it offers towards 
understanding how organizations are submitted to institutional pressures from the environment as 
regards legitimation and, consequently, survival (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). 
Institutional theory is not, however, a monolithic theoretical body. Quite the opposite, it is hard to 
set it into a single frame of reference, as it is a theoretical effort made by many authors at different 
times. Although there is a strong current setting the new institutionalism from the old (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991), this article leaves this separation aside as, were it maintained, it might inhibit the 
analytical potentials of this approach (Selznick, 1996). 
Institutional theory argues that organizations adapt to the environment moved not by issues of 
efficiency, but by the need for legitimacy. This perspective challenges the notion of organizations as 
being rational and objectives-driven, introducing a portrait of organizations guided by myths, symbols, 
and a necessity for social legitimacy (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). 
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Isomorphic Processes and Organizational Change  
 
Organizations operating in the same area are often very similar, whether in form or in practice. 
Powell & DiMaggio (1991) defined this phenomenon as institutional, outlining three institutional 
isomorphism mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative. 
Coercive isomorphism “is the result of formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by 
other organizations – on which they depend – and by cultural expectations of the societies in which 
they operate” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 67). These pressures materialize as actions of force or 
persuasion or as invitations to take part in coalitions or associations. Cases of coercive isomorphism 
are, for example, organizational changes caused by governmental pressures, usually based on 
legislation. The legal environment affects many aspects of an organization’s behavior and culture.  
Mimetic isomorphism occurs where an organization emulates another’s practices to face 
environmental uncertainties. “When organizational technologies are little understood [...]; when 
objectives are ambiguous; or when the environmental creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations can 
model after other organizations” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 69). Organizations end up replicating 
those other organizations regarded as more legitimate or more successful. 
The third source of isomorphism is normative. Normative isomorphism is usually grounded on 
professionalization processes. “By professionalization we understand collective struggle of members 
of an occupation, to define the conditions and methods of their work, and to establish a cognitive base 
and legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 70).  
All types of organizational change brought about by isomorphic processes occur as ways to facilitate 
the work of organizations in several activities: transactions with other organizations; professionals 
recruiting; recognition as legitimate, respectable organizations; and alignment that lets them take part 
in public and private competitions. These activities must, therefore, appear legitimate in the 
organizational field. 
 
The Legitimation of New Practices  
 
A new set of practices is neither legitimate nor illegitimate in and of itself. It is first invented or 
adopted by a small group of organizations interested in solving a technical problem (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1999). Therefore, institutionalization takes place in stages, as discussed below. 
Firstly, practices are undergoing sufficient formalization to enable transmission to other 
organizations or new members of an organization (Zucker, 1991). Adoption of such practices can be 
anticipated at an early stage if the practices have characteristics that make rationally them viable 
(March & Simon, 1958), i.e., if they include technical, political, cultural and economic dimensions. 
At a second stage, the actors responsible for the decision-making process at organizations start 
believing, that the new practices are valid and, based on this, an increasing number of organizations 
begin to adopt the new practices. Adopting organizations can ascribe values to the new practices, 
based on what the may have learned about them from other actors – known as the champions of 
innovation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999) – in the field (competitors, consultants, media, etc.). Moreover, 
the higher the number of organizations adopting these new practices, the more knowledge that is 
apprehended and disseminated in the field, which reduces the cost of adoption by other organizations 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). 
A team of institutional entrepreneurs – champions – with material interest in the dissemination 
process (Abrahamson, 1996; Caldas & Wood, 1999) creates a field for innovation. These champions 
may be professional groups, organizational gurus, special interest groups or consultants, who head the 
institutionalization process because institutionalization facilitates the action of champions (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1999). In order to create such a field, they need to connect a set of meanings that can be 
applied more generally to the practices and to the universe of adopting organizations (Strang & Meyer, Brazilian Nonprofit Organizations and the New Legal Framework: an Institutional Perspective 
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1993). Champions must simultaneously define a problem to be solved and the practices to solve it. 
When linked to classes that are regarded as legitimate, the practices acquire normative legitimacy 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). If the field in which they are embedded is soundly established, and where 
there are meaning that can be immediately assigned to the new practices, they will be quickly 
institutionalized. 
 
Organizational Inertia and Resistance to Change 
 
The environments in which organizations operate often cause impacts of several natures that give 
organizations the possibility of change. But not all of them change and some of those that do change 
do so very slowly. This process is known as organizational inertia. This is understood to mean the 
process by which organizations change slowly and through undesired processes (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Although (structural) inertia is a topic more closely associated with the Population Ecology authors 
like Hannan and Freeman (1984), earlier institutional authors already approached the issue. 
Selznick (1949), on studying the establishment of the Tennessee Vallley Authory (TVA) and the 
implementation of its grassroots development policy, showed that organizational leaderships tend to 
react to changes in organizational character. Organizations themselves become institutions when 
they are imbued with values, being raised from simple instruments to sources of personal gratification 
and group integrity. This process leads to a different organizational identity: character (Selznick, 
1984). The study of the formation of organizational character is, therefore, the institutional analysis 
process itself. “The emergence of organizational character reflects the irreversible element in 
experience and choice [...] acceptance of the irreversible practices is the process by which an 
organization’s character is formed” (Selznick, 1984, p. 35). An organization’s institutionalization 
process reflects its own history, the histories of those who worked there, the several vested interests of 
the groups it comprehends, and the manner how it adapted to its environment (Selznick, 1984). On the 
other hand, if institutionalization is not a straightjacket, that keeps the organization inert, “... 
management changes are often difficult when individuals have become used to and identify with long-
standing procedures [...] there is resistance against any change that may jeopardize individual 
interests” (Selznick, 1984, p. 15). Therefore, organizational inertia arises when these vested interests 
are threatened. 
Arthur Stinchcombe (1965), for whom inertia may arise in the process of an organization’s 
stabilization, followed a similar path. An organization’s format remains relatively stable over time 
because it was the most effective at the time of  the establishment of the organization, “and because it 
tends to become institutionalized even in if environmental pressures indicate that it is no longer as 
effective as before” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 153). Stinchcombe (1965) analyzed the reasons that lead 
organizations to maintain a stable organizational structure, listing three basic ones: the force of 
tradition, the presence of interests of certain groups who attempt to retain their positions and certain 
operational ideologies that wish to keep what has always worked (Stinchcombe, 1965). Here, too, 
the issue centers on vested interests: the organization resists change even when these are threatened. 
If both Selznick and Stinchcombe attribute organizational inertia to vested interests, Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that inertia is seated on the relationship 
between stability and legitimacy in the organizational field – where institutions are –, and on the 
strength of common understandings that, while seldom made explicit, result from institutional 
imperatives. An organization can only remain stable if its practices are regarded as legitimate by the 
field in which they exist. 
There is yet another, and peculiar, means by which organizations remain inert: cerimonialism 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). According to these authors, if the form of acting of the technical core of an 
organization is restricted by implications concerning efficiency, the management might decouple from 
other outside agents, creating mechanisms that simulate – by means of ceremony – the adoption of 
processes regarded as legitimate in an organizational field in order to deal with environmental 
pressures. As a result of this decoupling process, their legitimacy before other actors will increase, as Mário Aquino Alves, Natália Massaco Koga 
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will the possibility to consequently secure resources to pursue activities. A company, for example, 
might adopt the legal appearance of a nonprofit organization, but continue to operate as a private firm 
might, distributing profits to partners under the guise of compensation for services provided. 
 
 
THE BRAZILIAN NONPROFIT SECTOR’S NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 
Since the early 1990s, when the idea of Nonprofit Sector started to be incorporated into the several 
debate forums concerning the role of Civil Society in Brazil’s social context, another debate in parallel 
took place regarding the need to create a new legal framework to replace the legislation then in force 
which, because it contained concepts created in the early 1930s, was no longer appropriate to the new 
reality of relationships between the State and Civil Society (Comunidade Solidaria, 1997). 
In 1997, the Board of Comunidade Solidaria – a quango (quasi-non-governmental organization) that 
represented the governmental interface for Civil Society - began the Political Debate process with the 
participation of several representatives from Civil Society organizations and the government to 
restructure the nonprofit sector’s legal framework (Ferrarezi, 2001). At the sixth round of political 
debate, the following general agreements were established:  
1.  The Nonprofit’s Strategic Role. Strengthening the Nonprofit Sector, made up of public, nonprofit 
Civil Society entities, would be a national strategic decision due to its ability to generate projects, 
take responsibilities, take initiatives and mobilize the resources needed for the country’s social 
development. 
2.  The Change in the Nonprofit Sector’s Legal Framework. Strengthening the Nonprofit Sector 
required reformulating its legal framework.  
3.  Comprehensiveness of the Nonprofit Sector. Reformulating the Nonprofit Sector’s Legal 
Framework required building a broader understanding of what the very concept of Nonprofit 
Sector comprehended.  
4.  Transparency and Responsibility in the Nonprofit Sector. Expanding and strengthening the 
Nonprofit Sector would befall, above all, Society itself, which should establish transparency and 
accountability mechanism capable of leading to self-regulation.  
5.  The State and the Nonprofit Sector. Reformulating the Nonprofit Sector’s Legal Framework 
required that in addition to rights, Nonprofit Sector entities’ responsibilities before the State be 
established, wherever State resources are involved.  
The same meeting led to the establishment of specific agreements concerning: administrative records 
and files; agreements and covenants; self-regulation mechanisms; institutional answerability 
mechanisms; donations (and the pursuit of a new funding model); volunteer work regulation; closed-
end labor contracts; and information (Comunidade Solidaria, 1997). 
 
The Characteristics of Law No. 9790/99 
 
Law No. 9790/99 was passed in March 1999 to simplify procedures for institutional recognition of 
entities as Public Interest Civil Society Organizations (Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Interesse 
Público), as well as to facilitate partnerships with the public power, by means of criteria that were 
more closely related with the verification of the organization’s effectiveness and efficiency.  
For the purpose of the new law, nonprofit organizations were deemed to be private legal entities that 
did not distribute net or gross operating surpluses, dividends, bonuses, or shares in its assets acquired 
in the pursuit of activities among its partners, associates, directors, officers, employees or donors, Brazilian Nonprofit Organizations and the New Legal Framework: an Institutional Perspective 
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using them entirely to attain their corporate purpose. Many organizations would therefore benefit from 
the law, as their corporate purpose did not include any activity previously considered as public utility. 
Only welfare organizations (Law No. 91, dated Aug, 28, 1935), in their many forms, received this 
title. Law No. 9790/99, expanding the realm of public interest, also extended the OSCIP classification 
to entities whose corporate purposes included conservation, study, environmental and cultural 
research, microcredit, legal assistance, and others. 
To foster partnerships with OSCIPs, Law No. 9790/90 established the figure of Letter of 
Partnership. Unlike covenants and agreements, Letters of Partnership were proposed as more 
transparent and democratic instruments to encourage nonprofit organizations’ activities and projects.  
What was intended was for this law to slowly replace Law No. 91, dated 28 August 1935, which 
created the legal concept of Public Utility Titles (Títulos de Utilidade Pública), regulated by Decree 
No. 50517, dated 02 May 1961. This earlier law was not revoked. Law No. 9790/99 set forth an initial 
period of two years for nonprofits that already had Public Utility Titles to requalify as OSCIPs (as 
long as they met the legal requirements), and assuring them simultaneous maintenance of these two 
titles for the period (until 23 March 2001).  
 
The Resistance to the OSCIPs ACT and the Changes it Made  
 
Although the political discussion rounds Comunidade Solidária promoted did achieve six general 
agreements (Comunidade Solidaria, 1997), there was little initial acceptance of Law No. 9790/99. 
Close to the end of the two-year period established by law, contrary to governmental expectations, the 
number of requests for requalification as OSCIP submitted to the Ministry of Justice was very low. As 
indicated in Table 1, in the first two years (1999 e 2000), only 445 requests were submitted and, out of 
these, a mere 91 were granted (20.45%). This is a low figure, even for a sector whose statistics have 
not been subject to actual updates since 1991 (Landim, 1993). That year, the survey made by ISER 
researchers for the worldwide nonprofit mapping project promoted by the Johns Hopkins University, 
there were around 219,000 nonprofit organizations in Brazil (Landim, 1993). 
 
Table 1: Requests for Requalification as OSCIP (1999-2001) 
 
Year 1999  2000  2001  Total 
Granted 8  83  252  343 
Rejected 123  231  110  464 
Total 131  314  326 807 
Source : Ministry of Justice (2002). 
 
This shows that despite an apparent consensus in the Brazilian nonprofit sector discourse, there was 
substantial resistance by nonprofit organizations. The first portion of the survey identified two groups 
of resistance to the new law: NGOs and traditional philanthropic associations. These groups are 
responsible for the main criticisms against Law 9790/99. 
A little before the two-year period established by law ended, Provisional Measure (Medida 
Provisória) No. 2143-33, dated 21 May 2001, extended the original period for an additional three 
years, providing a total of five years for entities that held simultaneous Public Utility and OSCIP 
Titles to choose between them (until 23 March 2004). 
Provisional Measure No. 2113/32, dated 21 June 2001 amended law No. 9245/95, which thereafter 
also comprehended OSCIP-qualified entities. Since then, OSCIPs can offer Income Tax-deductible 
receipts to donating Legal Entities (corporate donations are an important source of financial support Mário Aquino Alves, Natália Massaco Koga 
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for entities). Except for the Income Tax exemption extended to all nonprofit organizations that meet 
the requirements set forth in article 15, Law No. 9532/97, OSCIPs had access to no tax incentives. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the number of submission in 2001 was practically the same as in 2000. 
What rose was the number of granted requests which rose from 20.45%, in the first two years to 
77.3% in 2001. This fact must be taken with a grain of salt: the figures do not new requests from 
repeat submissions. While there was an increase to the number of granted requests, this may reflect in 
part repeat submissions, rather than new ones; the total number of OSCIP-qualified organizations is 
still small. In addition, the government was forced to retreat and extend deadlines and benefits, clear 
admission that the law was not enjoying success. 
 
 
ON THE RESEARCH 
 
 
After this brief theoretical review of the institutional theory, emphasizing the manners in which it 
indicates mechanisms that explain change and resistance to change as a result of inertia, and of the 
new legal framework for the nonprofit sector, we proceed to present the research that illustrates the 
considerations made in this article. This study was prepared based on a broader survey whose purpose 
is to explore possible changes caused in the universe of Brazilian Nonprofit organizations, after the 
passing of Law No. 9790/99, in March 1999. This law, known as the Nonprofit Act, created a new 
legal concept: Public Interest Civil Organizations (Organizações da Sociedade Civil Interesse Público 
– OSCIP). The Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration expected massive adhesion to the new 
model within a short period of two years. This survey was carried out to determine whether or not 
such adhesion took place. 
The first step was to seek preliminary information on OSCIPs from the Ministry of Justice, the body 
in charge of analyzing and granting qualification requests. Since, as discussed earlier, adhesion was 
low in the first two years, open, semi-structured interviews were scheduled with relevant persons in 
the Brazilian Nonprofit scenario to identify points of interest so that the research might proceed. 
The second step was to identify the organizations whose requests for OSCIP qualification were 
granted by the Ministry of Justice, pursuant to the law. At the Ministry’s Website, we obtained the 
organizations’ postal information, date of qualification and area of operation. 
For the purposes of this survey, the 415 earliest OSCIPs created in Brazil were selected, i.e.,  those 
that were qualified in the period from 24 March 1999 – the effective date of law No. 9790/99 – until 
25 March 2002 – the latest update of the Ministry of Justice’s website at the time of the establishment 
of the objective of the survey. Between May and July 2002, questionnaires were sent to these 415 
OSCIPs to identify their main characteristics: date of establishment; data of OSCIP qualification; 
purpose of the institution; the institution’s action history; main beneficiaries; number of beneficiaries 
and number of collaborators; operating area, scope and region; and funding sources.  
Of the 415 questionnaires mailed, 124 were answered and returned between July and December 
2002. This response rate (close to 30%) can be considered high, as this is a non-mandatory 
questionnaire, i.e., one in which respondent participation takes place spontaneously. For the purposes 
of this study, only the data and information relative to the specific topic are presented throughout the 
analysis. Other information will be the subject of future projects. 
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SURVEY RESULTS  
 
 
Prior to describing the results obtained from the analysis of the data contained in the 124 returned 
questionnaires, we provide a brief description of the information provided by the Ministry of Justice 
concerning the universe of 415 OSCIPs initially selected. 
The Ministry of Justice data show that greater adhesion to the OSCIP model takes place after mid-
2001, more than two years after Law No. 9790/99 came into force, as shown in Chart 1. One 
interesting fact stands out regarding the coincidence between the period in which this greater adhesion 
to the model takes place and the enactment of two significant amendments to the law. These changes 
occurred as a result of two Provisional Measures (Medidas Provisórias): MP No. 2143-33, dated 31 
May 2001, and MP No. 2.113-32, dated 21 June 2001, which granted, respectively, an extension to the 
period during which the OSCIP title might be maintained simultaneously with another that the 
organization had previously, and the status of beneficiaries of Income Tax-deductible donations. Note 
that 65% of the organizations qualified after May 2002, i.e., after the changes to the law began. 
 
Chart 1: OSCIP-Qualified Organizations by Date 
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The sample, as shown in Table 2, displays the same behavior observed in the analysis of the general 
universe of 415 OSCIPs. Sixty-five percent of the 124 OSCIPs qualified after May 2001 (data in red) 
close to the 62% out of 415 OSCIPs qualified after May 2001.  
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Table 2: OSCIP-Qualified Organizations by Date of Qualification  
 
Date Org. Date Org. Date Org. Date  Org.
Sep/02/99 1 Sep/29/00 1 Apr/03/01 3 Sep/21/01  3 
Sep/22/99 1 Oct/23/00 2 Apr/17/01 1 Oct/08/01  3 
Jan/13/00 1 Nov/06/00  2 Apr/24/01 2 Oct/18/01  3 
Feb/02/00 1 Nov/16/00 1 May/04/01 2 Oct/31/01  2 
Mar/22/00 1 Nov/22/00 3 May/24/01 2 Nov/12/01  2 
Apr/03/00 2 Dec/20/00 2 Jun/06/01 1 Dec/10/01  7 
May/09/00 1 Dec/29/00 2 Jun/26/01 2 Dec/14/01  2 
May/26/00 1 Jan/16/01 2 Jul/13/01 3  Dec/27/01  3 
Jun/06/00 1 Feb/22/01 3 Jul/24/01 10  Jan/17/02  5 
Jun/26/00 4 Mar/01/01 3 Aug/10/01 1 Feb/07/02 2 
Jul/05/00 1  Mar/13/01  1  Aug/23/01  2  Mar/07/02  6 
Aug/22/00 3 Mar/22/01 1 Sep/12/01 7 Mat/25/02  9 
Source: the present survey. 
As for the date of establishment of these organizations, some interesting aspects can be inferred. Out 
of the 124 organizations, 122 indicated their dates of establishment. According to Table 3, the 
overwhelming majority of the organizations that attempted OSCIP qualification (86%) were founded 
in or after 1991.  
 
Table 3: OSCIP-Qualified Organizations by Date of Establishment 
 
Until 
1990 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
17  3 5 3 4 4 4 8  10  13  28  22  1  122 
14%  2% 4% 2% 3% 3% 3% 7% 8%  11% 23%  18%  1%  100%
Source: the present survey. 
One may infer from the table that the two most important segments in the so-called Brazilian 
Nonprofit Sector (Fernandes, 1994), traditional welfare and non-governmental organizations (created 
in the 1970s and 1980s to support social movements), which make up the majority and most visible 
portion of this sector, practically remained as they were, i.e., in institutional terms, organizations in 
these segments adopted an organizational inertia strategy. Another important datum from this table: 
53% of the organizations were founded in or after 1999, suggesting that they may have been 
established with the single purpose of seeking possible funds by means of establishing Letters of 
Partnership with the public power.  
To identify the researched institutions’ funding sources, a field with nine non-exclusive options, one 
of which was other sources.  
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Table 4: Sources of Funding of the OSCIPs that Answered the Questionnaire 
 
Source  Answers % of answers  % of OSCIPs 
Businesses, Foundations and Business 
Institutes   45 14%  36% 
Federal government body   44  14%  35% 
Local government body   40  13%  32% 
Member contributions   38  12%  31% 
State government body   35  11%  28% 
Sales of products and services   26  8%  21% 
International cooperation agencies   21  7%  17% 
Multilateral and bilateral agencies   6  2%  5% 
Other sources  50  16%  40% 
Non-funded 2  1%  2% 
Did not know or did not respond  4  1%  3% 
Disqualified 1  0%  1% 
 Total  312 100%   
Source: the present survey. 
 
Based on the data from Table 4, other sources has the greatest presence: this option was checked in 
40% of the returned questionnaires. Some of these specified what these other sources of funding might 
be. In some cases, the source mentioned could have fit into other choices available in the 
questionnaire, such as in the case where other sources are member donations, which might have been 
included under member contributions. We decided, however, to maintain the original responses in 
order to preserve the respondent’s understanding. At another part of these questionnaires, other 
sources of funding that the questionnaire did not address were presented, such as the Church and other 
Nonprofit organizations and donations from non-member individuals. 
The heavier presence of private funding (40%) in Table 4 as compared to the several governmental 
sources of funding draws attention, but only in relative terms. Considering the fact that the federal, 
local and state governments are present in 35%, 32% and 28% of responses, respectively, the 
relevance of public funding for the sampled organizations’ activities is clearly depicted. 
Another interesting datum drawn from the questionnaires is the number of options checked by 
organizations, as can be seen in Table 5. Although most of them indicated up to three different sources 
of funding, 6% of the 117 respondents checked more than six sources, which might raise the question 
of whether this is a kind of behavior according to which the main motivation for the organization is 
pursuit of as many public sources of funds as possible, as if they were rent collectors (Monzoni Neto, 
2001). Mário Aquino Alves, Natália Massaco Koga 
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Table 5: Number of Funding Source Options Checked 
 
Sources Options  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Number of Responses   32  31  30  13  5  3  2  1  0 
Source: the present survey. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA IN THE LIGHT OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
 
The context of the reform of the Nonprofit Sector’s legal framework in Brazil and, specially, the 
data obtained in this survey, suggest some interesting evidence to demonstrate, in the light of the 
institutional theory, the reason for the initial ineffectiveness of Law No. 9790/99 as regards adhesion 
by part of Brazil’s nonprofit organizations.  
 
Organizational Resistance and Inertia among NGOs and Traditional Organizations  
 
As shown earlier by the data relative to the date of founding of the qualified organizations, there is 
evident resistance to the new law on the part of the main actors in the possible field of the Nonprofit: 
NGOs and traditional entities. And this resistance is demonstrated quite simply by an organizational 
inertia process.  
More than a simple matter of unawareness of the law or even red-tape related problems, the Law 
9790/99, also known as the Nonprofit Act, is still ineffective because it has not achieved legitimacy in 
the field. In this case, the new model’s lack of legitimacy is grounded on two factors: the resistance 
from actors in the field and the maintenance of the previous organizational model. 
Resistance from NGOs. Since the beginning of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2001) 
administration, there was an attempt to draw the government and NGOs closer by means of 
Comunidade Solidária. NGOs – represented by ABONG (Brazilian Nongovernmental Organizations 
Association) – answered to this overture at first. They were offered an invitation to have a 
representative take a seat in the Board of Comunidade Solidária. This invitation was accepted with the 
appointment of Jorge Durão from the NGO FASE, as ABONG representative. 
This movement soon lost momentum, due mostly to the government’s lack of dedication in 
advancing and funding solutions for the social area (Bava, 2001). In May 1996, the ABONG 
representative renounced from the Board of Comunidade Solidária as protest against the government’s 
actions in the social field.  
After this estrangement, ABONG took a more cautious stance as regards the government’s attempts. 
When invited to take part in the Political Discussion debates concerning the new legal framework for 
the Nonprofit, ABONG accepted because it understood this to be a public space where its proposals 
and ideas might be heard (Bava, 2001). According to Sílvio Caccia Bava, a former chairman of the 
Brazilian NGO Association  (ABONG), after several rounds of Political Discussion, a project was 
drawn but, when the Bill was passed and became the Act, a surprise was in store: “the discussions did 
not correspond to the final text of the Law 9790/99” (Bava, 2001). Therefore, the NGOs remained 
bound to vested interests, i.e., they maintained a character of ideological opposition to the 
government and its ideologies. 
Maintenance of the previous status. Traditional welfares, in turn, are those professional or religious 
institutions whose purpose is charity. They are the most numerous and the oldest in the Brazilian 
nonprofit universe (Landim, 1993). Usually, they perform one single specific activity (hospitals, day-Brazilian Nonprofit Organizations and the New Legal Framework: an Institutional Perspective 
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care centers, homes, etc.) and declare themselves apolitical, meaning without any kind of political 
commitment. 
The major welfare organizations took the brunt of the effects of the discourse for professionalization 
of the Nonprofit Sector (Alves, 2002; Carvalho, 1999) and even attempted to update, particularly in 
the management area. In addition, many organizations felt a need to associate themselves with others 
for defense against outside threats (tax legislation and the issue of pilantropia – a popular term to 
describe fraudulent schemes disguised as welfares).  
This is the context in which Rede Brasileira de Entidades Filantrópicas (Brazilian Philanthropic 
Entities Alliance) – REBRAF (2001) appears, playing for the welfares the same role ABONG plays 
for NGOs. Given that this is a ploy by organizations that never articulated in the defense of their 
interests, their even forming an organization such as REBRAF is surprising.  
The establishment of REBRAF was brought about by Federal Law No. 9732/98, which eliminated 
tax exemptions for all welfares suspected of fraud (REBRAF, 2001).  
Unlike ABONG, REBRAF did not oppose the government, so much so that REBRAF had no 
official stance on the OSCIPs Law. Therefore, for more traditional organizations, the main problem 
raised by the OSCIPs Law was the lack of tax incentives since, besides Income Tax exemption (and 
that only for entities who do not pay salaries to their managers), OSCIPs benefited from no other 
incentives. In comparison, entities that already enjoyed Federal Public Utility Titles could offer 
Income Tax-deductible receipts to donating legal entities. Law No. 9249/95 establishes that donations 
made to Public Utility Civil Entities can be deducted for Income Tax purposes up to a limit of 2% of 
net profits. OSCIP qualification offered no similar benefits. 
If these organizations already complied with a certain legal status, a change in law that allows them 
to retain that status, even if not ideal, is a better choice than risking a new, uncertain model. In this 
sense, their position is similar to that of the NGOs: “why should NGOs adopt a model that carries so 
many doubts with it (...) if the law allows it, it is better to stick to the old model”. (Bava, 2001). 
Regarding this point, it is worth noting that the law allows organizations to – simultaneously – keep 
their Public Utility Titles and obtain OSCIP certification (even though only until 2005). This would 
allow traditional organizations and even some NGOs to trigger a decoupling process (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977): while meeting the new institutional environment by means of their OSCIP 
certifications, they would also retain their earlier structures, which would not challenge the 
organization’s character and would meet its vested interests (Selznick, 1984). But acceptance of the 
model was so low that not even this decoupling strategy was possible. This may be the result of a lack 
of incentives. As noted by Silvio Caccia Bava, the OSCIP status might only offer some advantages to 
NGOs through the ability to enter into Letters of Partnership. Since few such partnerships were 
formed, NGOs preferred to wait and see whether the OSCIP model would catch or not (Bava, 2001). 
And even if there were more Letter of Partnership, there would still be the issues of legitimacy and 
overcoming the discourse, which are relevant obstacles for many NGOs. Welfare organizations are of 
the veiled opinion that the project can be more of a curse than a blessing. This is because the new law 
offers no advantages to entities that already have Public Utility Titles; even the ability to pay salaries 
to managers fails to attract them because they would have to give up fiscal benefits when both titles 
could no longer be maintained at once.  
Finally, another explanation to the fact that welfares, in particular, retained their earlier status lies in 
their essential characteristic: tradition (Milofsky, 1997). By tradition we mean “(...) another manner of 
referral to practices and benefits achieved whose effects are felt over long periods of time” (Milofsky, 
1997, p. 263). Faced with signs of environmental change, these organizations prefer to maintain their 
structures, even if the environment points towards more legitimate formats (Stinchcombe, 1965). This 
does not apply, however, to younger organizations such as NGOs, where the burden of tradition is 
lighter that that of their underlying values.  
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Isomorphism and Legitimacy in New Nonprofit Organizations 
 
The case of Law No. 9760/99 might be interpreted, in classical terms, as pressures the government 
exerts through legislation which, by force of law, would lead to a coercive isomorphism process 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) among nonprofit organizations, who would comply, en masse, with the 
OSCIP model to be able to enter into Letters of Partnership with the state, leveraging funding. But the 
expected migration of organizations towards the OSCIP status as defined by Law No. 9760/99 did not 
come to be. The law’s attractions – such as the ability to pay salaries to managers and to enter into 
Letters of Partnership – were not sufficiently strong to lead older nonprofit organizations to adopt the 
OSCIP model. Still, both coercive and normative isomorphism can be identified in the case at hand. 
Although slight in comparison to the sector as a whole, the number of new organizations submitting 
requests for OSCIP qualification is quite expressive as compared to the total, as shown in Table 3. 
New organizations need quick legitimacy in the field to ensure access to funds and, consequently, to 
take root and survive. Since they have not yet become institutionalized (Selznick, 1984), the lack the 
required legitimacy in the field. Therefore, the law provides legitimacy – as in the processes of 
adopting ISO 9000 norms (Caldas & Vasconcelos, 2002) – more quickly than the natural passage of 
time, not to mention the immediate ability to enter into Letters of Partnership with the government. 
There is a professionalization process, as yet incipient, under way in the Nonprofit, mainly with the 
training of specialized professionals, such as managers, attorneys and, mostly, fund raisers, people 
who specialize in raising funds for nonprofit organizations. There is even a Brazilian Fund Raisers’ 
Association (Associação Brasileira de Captadores de Recursos – ABCR), which as established an 
ethics code for the activity (ABCR, 2001). 
These professionals, in order to acquire legitimacy in the field, among other factors, have been 
acting as champions for the sector (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999), in the sense of disseminating the 
ideology of necessary professionalism among nonprofit organizations in Brazil. By acting 
professionally at these organizations – particularly younger ones –, whether as hired professionals or 
as consultants, they become responsible for disseminating the OSCIP model as the one best aligned 
with the proper operation of organizations, causing an incipient normative isomorphism movement in 
the field of nonprofit organizations. 
 
 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
 
When Law No. 9790/99 was sanctioned by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in March 1999, 
Brazilian Civil Society organizations, identified as the Nonprofit, were expected to quickly and 
expressively adopt the OSCIP model.  
However, as discussed earlier, the massive, quick adhesion the government expected never took 
place. In this sense, the government forced itself to amend the law – extending terms and making 
donations Income Tax-deductible. On analyzing these changes, one concludes that they draw the 
OSCIP model closer to the old Public Utility Title, inasmuch as they grant benefits that were exclusive 
to the latter and ensure simultaneous maintenance of the two titles for a period of five years, i.e., three 
more than originally intended by Law No. 9790/99. 
The Institutional Theory – vis-à-vis the analysis of the data from the exploratory survey – lets us 
analyze how older organizations (NGOs and traditional welfare organizations) resisted against OSCIP 
qualification as a result of organizational inertia, as well as how coercive and normative isomorphic 
pressures have had a stronger impact on younger organizations. 
The spirit of Law No. 9790/99 is embedded in the new Nonprofit Sector discourse. Embracing this 
discourse, the government, through Comunidade Solidaria, proposed a model for nonprofit Brazilian Nonprofit Organizations and the New Legal Framework: an Institutional Perspective 
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organizations that restricts them to predetermined scopes which, in turn, fail to take the sector’s 
diversity into consideration. Even the existence of a Nonprofit Sector is open to argument (Spink, 
2000). 
The reality is complex enough to show that there is a field of nonprofit organizations – which, as a 
form of social construction, may be called the Nonprofit. Organizational fields (Scott & Meyer, 1991), 
as noted by Misoczky (2001), based on Pierre Bourdieu’s work, are not neutral complexes in which 
institutions simply appear and lend legitimacy to those that observe them. Organizational fields are 
power fields (Bourdieu, 1996), where there are different and asymmetric dispositions of power 
occupied by certain actors; those that occupy the power core in a certain field exert power over the 
other actors in the same field (Bourdieu, 1996). 
In the case of the OSCIPs Law, in the Nonprofit Sector field, NGOs and – mainly – traditional 
welfare organizations exert their power - through organizational inertia – and end up forcing the 
government to align its new law to their interests. 
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